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Abstract 
Since the onset of democracy in 1994, South Africa’s elections have returned 
similar levels of support for the major political parties. However, aggregate 
electoral stability does not necessarily shed light on the complexities that affect 
party support and voting intentions; nor does it tell us much about the 
increasing impact of socio-economic change on long-standing cleavage and 
electoral behaviour. Using data from eight national public opinion surveys 
spanning 1994 to 2004, this paper looks at trends and patterns in partisanship 
over time, explores changes to the demographic support bases of parties and the 
motivations of South African voters and finally reflects on the results of the 2006 
municipal elections, which are compared to overall trends in party support. This 
paper finds that dramatic socio-economic changes do not seem to have impacted 
heavily on the social composition of the ANC’s support base. There is little or 
no shift of allegiance across party lines by racial and other social groups. 
Instead, the strongest suggestion of electoral volatility lies in diminishing party 
loyalties for all parties and the corresponding growth of a ‘floating’ or an 
independent electorate. Rather than voters moving their support to another 
political party, partisanship has simply declined. Social groups remain 
important cues or information shortcuts for South African voters. Yet, partisan 
dealignment, coupled with a higher potential for inter-party movement, also 
suggests that static cleavage structures inherited from 1994 do not determine 
voting behaviour. Individual voters do not appear to be dominated by long-term 
socialised party attachments but also inform their party identification using 
evaluations of government performance and make reasoned judgments when 
choosing which party to support. The ANC still holds mass appeal across key 
demographic groups. Yet several factors signal that the ANC’s support may 
become less broad based, as the party becomes increasingly reliant on specific 
segments of the public for its electoral support. A silent revolution may have its 
biggest hold among the youngest voters who are becoming less aligned and the 
new middle classes who show signs of growth in partisanship. Moreover, 
dealignment and demographic changes within the entire population have begun 
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to change levels of partisanship as the sizes and distribution of different social 
groups alter and affect voting results. Although party loyalties seldom shift 
abruptly it would seem that partisanship in South Africa has fluctuated 
considerably more than is often acknowledged. Yet, electoral change has not yet 
had visible electoral consequences for the percentages of support for the 
governing party but instead has subtle implications for active political 
engagement and partisanship. Despite fewer voters predisposed towards any 
party new political contenders have been slow to emerge and garner a serious 
portion of the national vote. In the face of continued one-party dominance, and 
electoral stagnation, the greatest challenge for democracy in the next decade 
will be maintaining high levels of incumbent responsiveness towards citizens.  
  
Introduction 
Since the onset of democracy in 1994, South Africa’s elections have returned 
similar levels of support for the major political parties. The static nature of 
electoral outcomes has arisen out of the politicisation of numerically 
imbalanced, stable social cleavages. This has ‘racialised’ the nature of voting 
results and resulted in the continued electoral dominance of the African National 
Congress (ANC) over weak and fragmented opposition parties, raising concerns 
that genuine multiparty competition is limited and that potential for the 
alternation of power through the ballot box is substantially diminished. 
However, aggregate electoral stability does not necessarily shed light on the 
complexities that affect party support and voting intentions. Nor does it tell us 
much about the increasing impact of socio-economic change on long-standing 
cleavage and electoral behaviour. Although party loyalties seldom shift abruptly, 
it would seem that partisanship in South Africa has fluctuated considerably more 
than is often acknowledged.  
Changes to partisan support and voter motivations are signals of electoral 
fluidity in the party system which may have gone undetected because of the 
focus on aggregate electoral results. Alternatively, it may be that South Africa is 
on the cusp of an increasingly fluid party system. Either way, a ‘silent 
revolution’ among voters impacts on the quality and consolidation of South 
African democracy.  
Dealignment, or weakening partisan ties, holds contrary implications for 
democracy. Firstly, the stabilising influence of partisanship on party alignments 
is diminished. This should benefit South Africa, which requires greater electoral 
volatility to ensure a more competitive democracy, by freeing more voters to 
shift their party support to other contenders. Volatility also increases the 
unpredictability of elections and uncertainty of their outcomes, which, in turn, 
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encourages parties and candidates to be more responsive to voter interests. 
Against this, the weakening of party bonds can have negative consequences for 
the political process in the form of stagnation among voters, this typified by an 
increasing amount of voters declining to cast their ballots for any party 
whatsoever. Larger percentages of the vote for a governing party from a 
decreasing number of voters as turnout decreases indicates a decline in the 
quality of democracy. 
This paper looks at trends and patterns in partisanship over time. Data from 
eight national public opinion surveys spanning 1994 to 2004 explore changes to 
the demographic support bases of parties and the motivations of South African 
voters.1 Finally, the results of the 2006 municipal elections are compared to 
overall trends in party support.  
An Electorate in Transformation 
Voter behaviour is shaped by social and economic conditions. Rapid socio-
economic and political transformation can therefore alter long-standing or 
‘frozen’ cleavage structures that often guide electoral behaviour.  
The South African electorate has been subject to enormous change. First, the 
demographics of the electorate are vastly different to that of 1994. Generational 
change has dramatically altered the age composition of the population with an 
increasing proportion of youth voters aged between eighteen and thirty. 
Approximately one-third of the potential electorate in 2004 were too young to 
vote in 1994 (Seekings 2005a: 24). Demographic population shifts and growth 
have also altered the regional and racial composition of the electorate, with the 
urban and African share of the population rising.  
Second, socio-economic patterns have shifted. The emergence of a new black 
middle class due, in part, to redistributive policies and anti-discrimination 
measures, has begun to address income inequality between race groups. In 1995, 
73 per cent of the individuals in the top decile (the richest ten per cent) were 
white, but by 2000, there were as many African households in the top income 
quintile twenty per cent as there were white households (Seekings 2005a: 24). 
Long-term trends point to a substantial growth in the distribution of national 
income accruing to Africans, with its share increasing from 19.8 per cent in 
1970 to 35.7 per cent in 1996 (Southall 2004: 531). Southall also observes that 
by 2004, around 27 per cent of formally employed black Africans could be 
broadly defined as ‘middle class’.  
                                                 
1 Refer to appendix one for methodological information. 
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In contrast, structural constraints on job-creating economic growth, stubbornly 
persistent and high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, in addition 
to the inaccessibility of the formal economy (especially for the unskilled) 
combine to widen the inequality gap between the rich and the poor, as well as 
between workers within the formal sector of the economy and those who 
struggle to make a living outside it. The country’s gini co-efficient rose from 
0.73 per cent in 1995 to 0.80 in 1998 (Southall 2004: 531). While inter-racial 
inequality has declined, intra-racial inequality is on the increase - among 
Africans the gini co-efficient rose from 0.70 to 0.81 between 1995 and 1998 
(ibid). Changing material conditions have encouraged a shift from race to class 
as the basis of inequality, and led to a shift in self-defined social identities away 
from race towards class and occupations (Lombard, 2003). 
A fundamental shift in social delivery and budgetary spending ensures social 
spending is heavily focused on the poor. Nonetheless, despite the extension of 
social welfare and redistribution, the post-apartheid state has shown limited 
capacity to address poverty and inequality rapidly. The rise of social movements 
connected to delivery issues is also indicative of an emerging class-
consciousness among the poor (Ballard, Habib and Valodia 2006). Moreover, 
other societal developments - such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, increasing 
educational opportunities and access to media and information- have made a 
major impact on many people’s lives.  
After what is now over a decade of democracy, the focus of politics in South 
Africa has shifted from the realisation of ‘liberation’ towards urgent concerns 
such as social redress and nation-building facing a post-apartheid society. South 
African citizens confront and debate issues that represent a more ‘normalised’ 
political terrain, such as housing, education and budgetary matters and directly 
experience the outcomes of policy choices, and the political successes and 
failures of an ANC-led government. 
By 2004 the electorate differed substantially from the one that had participated 
in the 1994 elections in terms of generational experiences and expectations, 
historical memory, class mobility, poverty levels, education, and political 
information. Such rapid social transformation might be expected to hold 
consequences for voting patterns by reshaping the static cleavage structures 
inherited from apartheid, yet dramatic socio-economic changes do not seem to 
have impacted heavily on the social composition of the ANC’s support base. 
Instead, the strongest suggestion of electoral volatility lies in diminishing party 
loyalties for all parties and the corresponding growth of a ‘floating’ or an 
independent electorate.  
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Looking beneath aggregate electoral outcomes  
At first glance, voting patterns in South Africa appear fairly stable at the macro 
level. Table 1 present aggregate election results over three national elections 
showing similar outcomes with consistent proportions of votes obtained by the 
governing party and opposition parties respectively.  
Table 1 Aggregate electoral results (%)  
 1994 1999 2004 
ANC  63.12 66.35 69.69 
Opposition parties * 36.88 33.65 30.31 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Independent Electoral Commission 
Note: * The principle opposition parties during these elections were the National Party (to 
become the New National Party and was not an opposition party at the time of the 1994 
election as it constituted part of the Government of National Unity); the Democratic Party (to 
become the Democratic Alliance); Inkatha Freedom Party; the Freedom Front Plus; The Pan 
Africanist Congress; the United Democratic Movement (from 1999 election onwards) and a 
number of smaller parties.  
Table 2 Voting Age Population (VAP), Registration, Turnout and 
Proportion of VAP for governing party and opposition:2  
 1994* 1999 2004 
Voting age population (VAP)  22 709 152 22 589 369 27 865 537  
Number of registered voters  No 
registration 
18 172 751 20 674 926 
VAP registered % No 
registration 
80.4 75.4 
Overall turnout / total votes cast 19 533 498 15 977 142 15 612 671 
Turnout of registered voters % No 
registration 
89.3 76.7 
Turnout of VAP % 86 71.8 57.8 
% of VAP vote for the ANC ** 53.8 46.9 39 
% of VAP vote for opposition parties 32.1 23.7 16.9 
% of abstaining voters 14 29.4 43.9 
Source: Independent Electoral Commission; Reynolds 1999; Piombo & Nijzink 2005  
Notes: * In 1994 there was no formal registration and hence no voters’ roll. To vote in the 
1994 elections citizens simply had to present their identity document. 
** Calculated using total votes for ANC/total VAP  
                                                 
2 Sources for VAP figures: Reynolds (1999); 2004 VAP figures based on Statistics South 
Africa Census 2001 figures. Also see Nijzink and Piombo (2005). The proportion of VAP for 
the ANC and opposition is calculated using total votes for ANC / total VAP. In 1994 there 
was no formal registration and hence no voters roll. To vote in the 1994 elections citizens 
simply had to present their Identity Document.  
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However, when turnout figures and the percentage of all eligible voters 
supporting the ANC across the three national elections since the 1994 elections 
are considered, they suggest that several major changes have occurred in the last 
ten years, particularly in terms of the size of the active ANC electorate.   
South Africa has witnessed a general decline in electoral participation in terms 
of both registration and voter turnout. First, whilst the eligible voting age 
population (VAP) has increased (due to population growth) by approximately 5 
million over ten years, the number of registered voters has not increased at the 
same rate. Between 1999 and 2004 the IEC increased the voters roll by 2.5 
million to 20.6 million voters. Yet, according to VAP figures 7 million potential 
voters were not recorded (Kabemba 2005:95). Second, the number of votes cast 
(or overall turnout) has actually decreased by roughly 3.9 million since 1994 
despite growth in VAP and increases in registration.  
Third, despite increasing electoral margins for the ANC from 63 per cent to 69 
per cent, the percentage of the VAP voting for the governing party has not 
increased or even remained static in proportion to population growth. In fact, its 
percentage of actual support has decreased from 53 to 39 per cent of South 
Africa’s eligible voting population. By calculating the proportion of the VAP 
who voted for the ANC (calculated using total votes for ANC / total VAP) we 
can see that the ANC has retained 72 per cent of its original 1994 vote share but 
lost approximately 28 per cent. Significant decreases in turnout and a reduced 
share of the vote qualifies the nature of the ANC’s victory in the 2004 national 
election. In a corresponding fashion, the opposition has lost one-half of its vote 
share among the eligible voter population. If the magnitude of the ANC’s latest 
2004 election victory shrinks under scrutiny, so do the gains of the opposition.  
Data shows increasing percentages of potential voters, and an increase in the 
number of registered voters since 1999, but the number casting a vote has 
declined. Apparent aggregate electoral stability can conceal significant 
individual-level flux and disguise significant changes to internal party coalitions. 
Yet, it is harder to predict who the abstainers are, and whether they are 
government or opposition supporters. Moreover, aggregate data does not shed 
light on whether there is any significant voter realignment between parties, nor 
can it tell us about the intensity of commitment towards a party and the 
motivations or reasons for support.  
Aggregate distributions of party identification 
Using survey questions that measure the concept of party identification, this 
section taps macropartisan movements in the population over time. Party 
identification (PID) is widely used as an indicator of partisan loyalty and 
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measures the extent to which voters ‘identify with’ or ‘feel close to’ political 
parties in much the same way that they identify with social groups. Partisanship 
questions are designed to measure the basis of party support among the mass 
electorate.  
US and European studies show that party identification is analytically separate 
from actual vote choice but often guides it (Campbell, Converse, Miller & 
Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002). Despite criticisms that the 
concept’s explanatory powers as a measurement variable are limited, 
particularly outside the United States, recent studies show that the concept 
remains a significant methodological variable in electoral studies (Green et al. 
2002). Party identification can still provide a common explanatory framework 
and be usefully applied across different political settings and therefore provides 
an appropriate starting point for any analysis of a partisan political preference. 
Consequently, numerous international surveys use the indicator to tap long-term 
commitment to parties with the concept applied successfully in post-Communist, 
Asian, African, and Brazilian studies. If the same holds true in South Africa then 
we should also be able to use the party identification concept to assess the 
overall extent of partisan stability, volatility and dealignment among voters.3  
Levels of partisanship: partisans vs. non-partisans 
After initially high levels of partisanship after the historic 1994 ‘liberation’ 
election, the proportion of partisans in the electorate declines significantly 
thereafter, fluctuating between 64 per cent and 45 per cent over the following 
ten years. Since 1995 no more than 64 per cent of the population have ever 
stated that they feel close to a political party. Decreases in partisanship are 
accompanied by corresponding increases in the proportion of non-partisans or 
‘independents’. By end of 2004 the percentages of partisans and independents 
are almost equal in number, with partisans at only 53 per cent. Ten years into 
democracy almost half the electorate were not overly loyal to one particular 
political party, nor guided at elections by long-standing partisan ties when 
                                                 
3 The measures of Partisan Identification were gauged by the following questions in all eight 
surveys: ‘Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?’ (If yes) ‘Which 
party is that?’ The dependent variable was dichotomised into identification with a party or as 
a non-partisan (independent) and this measures the extent of PID. Later, the dependent 
variable was further divided into three-way identification with the ANC governing party, the 
opposition or non-partisan to measure the direction of PID. Lastly, ANC party identifiers 
were isolated from the entire survey sample and tested using the strength of PID variable, ‘Do 
you feel very close, somewhat close, or not very close (to the ANC)?’  The wording of the 
PID question differs slightly in the 1994 survey. Thereafter the question wording follows the 
international standard using the ‘party closeness scale’, which was developed for use outside 
of the United States and particularly in multi-party systems. 
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deciding which party to support, suggesting that short-term forces are potential 
influences on party support.  
Table 3 Distribution of Partisans and Non-partisans over time % 
Years Partisans Non-Partisans/ Independents Total 
1994 88 12 100 
1995 58 42 100 
1997 58 42 100 
1999 45 55 100 
2000 46 54 100 
2002 64 36 100 
2004 60 40 100 
2004  53 47 100 
Average 59 41 100 
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South Africa matches European figures more closely than other emerging 
democracies. In most western European countries, 60-70 per cent of voters 
identify at least somewhat with a party, though this figure has declined in recent 
decades. In Latin America, party identification was 67.1 per cent in Uruguay, 
37.6 per cent in Argentina; 35.9 per cent in Chile; 33.3 per cent in Venezuela; 
and 32.5 per cent in Brazil (Mainwaring 1999: 30). Only 22 per cent of the 
Russian electorate identify with a party, while 40 per cent do so in the Czech 
Republic, 30 per cent in Slovakia, 20 per cent Hungary and only 15 per cent in 




Direction of partisanship: ANC vs. independents vs. 
opposition 
Self-declared partisans can be further divided into those who support the ANC 
and those who support opposition parties. Table 4 and Graph 2 show the ratios 
of ANC supporters, opposition supporters (includes all opposition parties) and 
independents across the electorate over time. Although the vast majority of 
declared partisans are ANC supporters there are several developments.  
First, party identification seems to be weakening for all parties. Both the ANC 
and opposition parties have leaked partisans to the independents category, which 
has increased dramatically over time. Yet independents are disproportionately 
coming from the opposition parties, which have experienced a much higher rate 
of decline than the ANC. This development can be best described as 
‘asymmetrical partisan dealignment’, as people move away from feeling close to 
a particular party but more so from the opposition.  Unable to maintain their 
proportional share of partisans, opposition parties have been the biggest losers. 
That opposition parties have proliferated and fragmented since 1994, together 
with the fact that they share an increasingly smaller portion of partisans, 
suggests that they have to work harder to convince voters to support them at 
elections.  
Second, non-partisans now make up a remarkable proportion of the eligible 
electorate (defined here as surveyed citizens who are eligible to vote) fluctuating 
between 36 per cent and 56 per cent. The high number of floating voters whose 
support is in doubt at the beginning of an election suggests that there is a higher 
than expected potential for electoral competition or movement in support across 
political parties.  
Table 4 Direction of partisanship over time % 
Years ANC  Independents Opposition  Total  
1994 60 12 28 100 
1995 38 43 19 100 
1997 42 42 16 100 
1999 35 55 10 100 
2000 34 56 10 100 
2002 46 36 18 100 
2004 52 41 7 100 
2004  42 48 10 100 




Graph 2: Direction of Partisanship
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Lastly, on average less than half the electorate are ANC partisans. In 1994, 60 
per cent of the electorate were ANC partisans, but this figure has since 
fluctuated between 34 per cent and 52 per cent of the total electorate.  
The partisan responses of social groups  
Despite general consensus that the African population continues to identify with 
the ANC while minority groups identify more so with opposition parties, limited 
empirical knowledge exists about the demographics of supporters and non-
voters. I analyse the partisan responses of key demographic groups to detect 
changes in the social composition of party support bases. The strength of 
partisanship among social groups also informs us as to whether today’s ANC 
partisans are as loyal as they once were. 
Race groups4 
Black African voters are consistently more likely to identify with a party than 
other minority race groups. Yet, on average only 65 per cent of black voters are 
close to a particular party, whereas up to 49 per cent have declared themselves 
to be independents in some years. Subtle changes to the strength of support 
given to the ANC by black Africans are also noticeable. The proportion of party 
identifiers who are ‘very close’ to the party have increased while those who feel 
‘somewhat’ or ‘not very close’ have steadily decreased. This makes sense when 
one considers that dealignment is most likely to occur first among the weakest 
                                                 
4 Whilst race is not recognised as a scientific category, for historical reasons socially 
constructed racial identities continue to be socially relevant in South Africa. 
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partisans. Black voters are not an enthusiastic, unquestionably loyal electorate as 
is often assumed. Levels of ANC partisanship among black South Africans have 
fluctuated between 62 per cent and 42 per cent, decreasing steadily since 1994, 
but have not been counter-balanced by shifts to opposition parties. Instead there 
is a significant increase in independents among this racial group, suggesting that 
core ANC support is smaller than initially supposed and many voters support 
this party, not because they are loyal partisans, but because they do not regard 
opposition parties as feasible alternatives. 
Table 5 Levels of partisanship by race group % 
Year Indian Coloured White Black African 
1994 81 88 85 89 
1995 16 51 43 65 
1997 36 55 38 64 
1999 18 30 17 53 
2000 6 39 30 51 
2002 43 47 41 73 
2004 22 44 24 67 
2004 31 53 34 57 
Average 32 51 39 65 
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Levels of partisanship among white South Africans have fluctuated between 16 
per cent and 41 per cent, decreasing dramatically since 1994. Correspondingly, 
the increase in independents is significant. Support for the governing party 
remains negligible. Among Coloured South Africans we see a mixed trend 
emerging. Support for opposition parties has declined steadily over time, due 
possibly to the demise of the New National Party, (the formerly ruling party 
which merged itself into the ANC in 2005), offset somewhat by the growth in 
support for the Democratic Alliance among this racial group, while support for 
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the ANC has also increased. Overall, there are more independents than partisans 
among Coloureds since 1995. Indians reflect similar trends to that of other 
minority racial groups although dealignment has been remarkably rapid. Support 
for both the ANC and opposition parties is consistently low. The proportion of 
independents among Indians is the highest out of all racial groups and fluctuates 
between 57 per cent and 96 per cent.  
While racial minority voters may still participate at elections the data implies 
that opposition parties have to actively campaign to mobilize the support of 
these voters compared to the ANC, which still attracts a relatively higher 
proportion of partisans among black South Africans. While higher ratios of 
independents exist among smaller racial groups, a smaller proportion of 
independents among black Africans can still amount to more independents 
numerically compared to the total of independents coming from minority 
groups. Given the demographic composition of South Africa, continuing 
increases in non-partisans among the black electorate holds the key to future  
electoral realignments. 
 
Urban vs. rural residents5  
Trends in data confirm the overall decline in party identification among urban 
and rural voters. However, data also indicate that there are consistently fewer 
partisans and more independents among urban residents. In some years 
independents make up a majority of the urban electorate. In contrast, rural areas 
consistently have more partisans. Yet by the end of 2004 the level of rural 
partisanship had dropped to urban levels (53 per cent).  
There is a consistently higher ratio of ANC supporters among rural compared to 
urban partisans and, when testing for strength of party identification, there are 
consistently more strong ANC partisans among rural residents than urban 
residents. Overall, rural areas offer more loyal ANC identifiers compared to 
their urban counterparts. Opposition partisans among urban and rural residents 
are in steady decline over the years, with only a slightly higher proportion in 
urban areas. Opposition party identifiers are mainly urban dwellers.  
 
                                                 
5 Surveys from 2002 onwards use urban-rural definition adopted by Statistics South Africa. 




Table 6 Distribution of partisanship by urban-rural group % 
Years Urban  Rural 
1994 87 89 
1995 55 61 
1997 55 64 
1999 43 45 
2000 44 48 
2002 60 71 
2004 56 66 
2004  52 53 
Average 56 62 
 













Four age cohorts were designed to loosely reflect or capture four different 
political generations and provide a simple way to measure whether different age 
groups or generations affect partisanship. In 1994, the 18-29 year olds had 
reached the age of 16 years between 1981 and 1992 and are the ‘1980s’ 
generation. The 30-44 year old cohort in 1994 had reached the age of 16 
between 1966 and 1980; they therefore comprised the cohort that experienced 
the 1976 youth uprisings. The 45-59 year old cohort in 1994 had reached the age 
of 16 years between 1951 and 1965 and constituted the pre-Soweto generation 
that witnessed the rise and incarceration of Nelson Mandela. Anyone aged 60 or 
over in 1994 had turned 16 in or before 1950. Finally, a post-apartheid 
generation who have little direct early-adult experience of apartheid enters the 




While a sharper decline in partisanship among younger cohorts might have been 
expected, data show little variation between cohorts, with no remarkable 
patterns or trends. Trends among ANC partisans also show little variation. It 
appears that the growth in Independents and corresponding decline in ANC 
partisanship has little to do with voters’ age groups. In fact, the youngest cohorts 
have the highest proportion of ANC partisans. Yet, rapid population growth 
among the youngest cohort also suggests that this group will have a higher 
number of independents compared to older groups. The impact of the post-
apartheid generation is only likely to be detected after 2000, which is somewhat 
confirmed by the decline in partisanship among the 18-29 year olds and in 2004, 
when older cohorts also show the highest number of loyal partisans who feel 
‘very close’ to a party. Does this reflect the beginning of a new post-apartheid 
age cohort entering the electorate with less partisan attachments? This can only 
be confirmed in time. Young voters also show less support for opposition parties 
compared to their older counterparts, a possible indicator of increasing 
stagnation of opposition parties if they are unable to mobilise the pool of 
growing young ‘independents’ in coming years.   
Table 7  Levels of partisanship by age cohort’s % 
Years 18-29 yrs 30-44yrs  45-59yrs 60 plus 
1994 87 88 88 91 
1995 60 58 58 56 
1997 61 59 56 51 
1999 45 48 43 38 
2000 46 46 47 41 
2002 60 67 67 62 
2004 60 59 59 59 
2004  49 55 53 58 
























While few surveys have a variable measuring class they all tap class through 
questions that ask respondents about their occupation and working status.6 
Defining the notion of class in an industrialising and post-colonial setting such 
as South Africa is problematic (Southall 2004: 521). In particular, when one 
uses occupational categories to determine class categories, results must be 
interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, for parsimonious reasons and because these 
questions, and not items tapping income, appear in every survey, responses were 
divided into four main categories using occupational and employment data. The 
Owner/Employer category includes people who own business or employ people, 
the self-employed, managing directors and commercial farmers. This constitutes 
what Dalton (1998) has called the ‘old middle class’, or in Marxist terms, those 
who own the means of production. The Professional/Supervisory category 
includes office supervisors, industrial foremen, and professionals (lawyers, 
engineers, doctors). According to Dalton this constitutes the ‘new middle class’ 
since these people live middle class lifestyles but do not own the means of 
production. The Worker category includes non-manual and manual, skilled and 
unskilled workers, soldiers, police, other security workers and subsistence 
farmers. The final category includes those who are unemployed, never had a job 
or have not worked long enough to consider themselves as workers. 
Housewives, students and the disabled are excluded from above categories as it 
                                                 
6 The class status variable was constructed using surveys questions that ask respondents to 




is unclear which economic class they fit into (especially when cross-tabulated 
with secondary variables such as income). 
Middle class respondents within the ‘old’ and ‘new’ middle classes evince a 
steady decline in partisans until 1999 and a steady rise thereafter. Similarly, 
respondents from the working class and who are unemployed also show an 
overall decline in partisanship but there are consistently more partisans in the 
latter categories.  By 2002 partisanship among all class groups has stabilised, 
rising slightly and clustered between 55 per cent and 68 per cent. By 2004, the 
working class has the highest level of partisans, replacing the unemployed who 
begin to show slight signs of decline by 2004. Subtle changes may present the 
beginnings of a newly emerging pattern among classes, where the unemployed 
begin to withdraw support from parties in general, while the wealthier middle 
classes increase their partisanship.  






1994 85 90 88 89 
1995 66 43 58 60 
1997 43 53 58 65 
1999 27 33 50 49 
2000 38 51 48 45 
2002 55 62 68 65 
2004 51 48 61 60 
2004 48 54 56 51 
Average 52 54 61 61 
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After 1994, ANC partisanship drops dramatically among the owner/ employer 
category whilst the proportion of independents increases steadily. Opposition 
partisans show slight decreases until 2002 after which they decrease sharply. By 
1999, however, the number of ANC partisans in the owner/ employer category 
begins to rise steadily, overtaking opposition partisans by 2002, while 
independents begin to stabilise. The data may reflect the emergence of the new 
African black middle class, whose support for the ANC begins to dominate this 
social category by the year 2000. Where control over the means of production 
lay firmly with middle class whites in the early years after the end of apartheid, 
by 2000 the African middle class share had increased, thereby changing the 
proportion of ANC partisans in this category. These people slowly come to 
supplant the older white middle class, whose partisanship has steadily declined 
since 1995.  
The direction of partisanship in the professional/supervisory category is reversed 
by the end of 2004. Whereas opposition partisans made up 70 per cent of this 
category in 1994 (while the ANC only 21 per cent), by 2004, 34 per cent of 
partisans are ANC supporters while only 19 per cent are opposition supporters. 
Again, this is reflective of the rise of a new professional black middle class 
whose aspirations have been met and, as a social class, they respond with higher 
levels of party support for the ANC. A dramatic decline in opposition partisans 
is reflected in a steady rise of independents in this category. By end of 2004, 47 
per cent are independents. 
Changes to the middle class categories do not exemplify a situation of changing 
partisan minds but rather of changing partisan groups. In other words, middle 
class voters have not necessarily changed their partisan opinions – instead, 
fluctuations are more likely due to the introduction of a new set of partisan 
minds as the overall racial composition of this social group readjusts. 
Among workers, ANC partisans remain steadfast over time, but never make up 
more than half the electorate in any year. Opposition partisans among workers 
are low and decline from 28 per cent in 1994 to 10 per cent in 2004. 
Independents rise steadily over the years, only declining slightly between 2000 
and 2002, but rising again thereafter.  In the unemployed category, the pattern is 
largely the same. If we look at ANC partisans across social groups ANC 
partisans are highest among the unemployed and then workers, whose trends 
largely mirror each other. Yet, these two categories show decreases in support 
over time. In contrast, the two middle class categories show clear increases in 
support for the ANC, especially among owner/employers at the end of the time 
span. Variations may also be reflective of emerging tensions between black 
capitalists and the civil petty bourgeoisie versus the working class and 
unemployed as former groups become less inclined to remain their traditional 
political allies (Southall 2004: 539-540).  
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Data permitting, it may be interesting to look more closely at variations to 
partisanship within the (new) black middle class. As Southall (2004: 539) states, 
various fractions of the black middle class have shared the benefits of economic 
growth and transformation differentially. In particular, the relative economic 
advantage of ‘state managers’, corporate fractions of the black middle class, 
along with the more advantaged sections of the civil petty bourgeoisie suggests 
the possibility that partisanship is stronger among these groups compared to the 
black trading petit-bourgeoisie or ‘traders’, although a dependence of the latter 
upon procurement might mean that they are even more strongly partisan.  
The impact of class on voting has been more regionalised and more pronounced 
among minority groups. In the Western Cape working class coloured voters tend 
to support the NNP (before its demise) and DA whilst middle-class Coloured 
voters were divided, with many supporting the ANC (Seekings 2005b:4). Habib 
and Naidu (1999) also concluded that class played a role in Indian areas in Kwa-
Zulu Natal.  
 














Profesional/ Supervisory Owner/ Employer
 
So far, analyses focus on fluctuations and variations in levels and direction of 
party identification within social groups. However, an important part of this 
exercise is to investigate which social groups have the highest proportions of 
ANC or opposition identifiers and independents. After comparing the median 
averages of all social groups, the social or demographic groups with the most 
ANC partisans are black Africans, the unemployed, rural dwellers, and workers.    
The most likely social groups to provide opposition partisans are whites, 
Coloureds, middle class and older voters. However, by looking at both tables it 
is clear that the highest averages among opposition identifiers are much smaller 
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compared to averages of ANC partisans found in other social groups. Opposition 
partisans only make up an average of 26 per cent in the white racial group, the 
group with the most opposition partisans, compared to 56 per cent of ANC 
identifiers among black Africans. Racial groups always hold the most partisans.   
Table 9  ANC identifiers in each social group 




Professional/ supervisory 29 
Owner/employer 30 
60+ years 36 
Urban residents 39 
45–59 year-olds 41 
30–44 year-olds 44 
18–29 year-olds 46 
Workers 46 
Rural residents 50 
Unemployed 50 
Black African 56 
Table 10  Opposition identifiers in each social group 
Social group Percentage 
Black African 9 
Unemployed 10 
18–29 year-olds 12 
Rural residents 12 
30–44 year-olds 15 
Workers 15 
Urban residents 17 
45–59 year-olds 18 
Indians 19 





Black Africans have the least independents of all social groups followed by rural 
dwellers, the unemployed and workers. Minority racial groups have the most 
followed by middle class urban voters.  
Overall, the data shows that the number of voters who feel close to a particular 
party has declined significantly since 1994. Less than half the electorate are 
ANC partisans while, on average, almost half are not guided by long-standing 
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party ties at elections. While both the ANC and opposition parties have 
experienced losses to their long-standing support bases, the latter have lost 
more. Party identification has also fallen relatively evenly across social groups, 
with the greatest losses among minority racial groups. The relatively even 
pattern of dealignment across all social groups has meant that the key cleavage 
structures that defined party support in 1994 are much the same in 2004.  
Table 11 Independents in each social group 
Social group Percentage 
Black African 36 
Rural residents 38 
Unemployed 40 
Workers 40 
30–44 year-olds 41 
45–59 year-olds 42 
18–29 year-olds 43 
60+ years 44 






Perhaps the most interesting finding is that there is little or no shift of allegiance 
across party lines by racial and other social groups. Rather than voters moving 
their support to another political party, partisanship has simply declined. Yet, 
partisan dealignment, coupled with a higher potential for inter-party movement, 
also suggests that static cleavage structures inherited from 1994 do not 
determine voting behaviour. Instead, voters appear to make reasoned judgments 
when choosing which party to support. 
The micro motivations of voters 
People generally choose political parties in response to a number of factors. 
Scholars argue that although party identification may be learnt through early 
family socialisation, it is also a running tally of current party assessment or a 
‘standing decision’ that is constantly updated through evolving evaluations of 
government performance, party images, and cognitive skills (Inglehart 1977; 
Fiorina 1979; Achen 1992, Popkin, 1994). Recent analyses confirm that long-
standing party loyalties do not prevent partisans from updating their evaluations 
in light of new information (Green et al. 2002). Short-term changes to party 
identification can and do occur. If this were also true in South Africa, then we 
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can expect to see similar short-term factors influencing party identification. 
Accelerated socio-economic transformation has changed the social structure of 
South African society, potentially affecting factors that shape political 
behaviour. If a person’s position in the social structure is changing, the kinds of 
partisan cues that emanate from social positioning may be changing. Besides, 
people’s value systems are not simply robotic reflections of the social structure. 
As people acquire new information and skills their experiences and evaluations 
also matter. Adjustments therefore involve changes to the way people evaluate 
economic and political governance, levels of cognitive skills, and the type of 
information available.  
Evaluations of government performance  
The literature suggests voters judge which party is best suited to govern by 
looking at evaluations of their past performance and future promises (Downs 
1957; Fiorina 1979). Voters then use economic and political performance 
evaluations to reward or punish government for their material improvements or 
economic decline.  
Taking into account increasing unemployment, job losses, HIV/Aids and poor 
service delivery one might expect a significant decline in ANC support. There is 
a decline in party identification and turnout for the ANC yet the party continues 
to attract majority support at elections. Why? Firstly, as shown earlier, votes for 
opposition parties have fallen faster than votes for the ANC. However, support 
for the ANC can be accounted for by the positive ratings of its performance in 
government. As voters evaluate the ANC government, they do so by also 
looking at the massive relative improvements in their lives. Government’s 
redistribution policies have offset much of the negative economic developments 
of the past decade and partly account for high levels of electoral support. The 
majority of voters also perceive that their future socio-economic interests can be 
best achieved by an ANC government.    
Data from the Opinion ’99 survey show that South African voters do not 
automatically form opinions about the national economy from their personal 
conditions. Second, voters make distinctions between overall government 
performance and performance within specific issues areas (Mattes and Piombo 
2001). Voters praise government on areas where they have experienced 
profound social change such as the provision of essential services, housing and 
education. Correspondingly, they criticise government on the very issues that 
they see as the country’s most pressing problems such as crime and 
unemployment, as seen in the downward trend in public opinion on these issues 
since 1994 (Mattes 2005: 48). Yet, when asked for an overall assessment of 
government performance, voters give generally positive remarks. Overall 
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positive evaluations are therefore informed by a balanced assessment of specific 
policy areas. When Mattes, Taylor and Africa (1999) tested the influence of 
attitudinal evaluations of government performance and political parties, whilst 
deliberately excluding race and other sociological variables, they found that a 
very large majority of partisan choices can be correctly predicted.  
While these voters do not make up their mind anew at every election, the data 
does suggest that new information about political and economic developments 
combine with partisan loyalties. So although voters take their socio-economic 
positions into account, the electoral consequences of poverty and unemployment 
are offset by successful redistributive social policies. The poor do not seem to 
hold government directly responsible for their financial situations and partisan 
loyalties are able to withstand short-term disappointments. For those whose 
loyalties are shifting through poor evaluations of economic performance, the 
data suggests that they simply move into the non-electorate. Table 12 compares 
the evaluations of identifiers with non-partisans among black Africans, a social 
group who are generally pro-ANC during the year 2000. Black African 
identifiers consistently have higher proportions of positive evaluations of 
government performance than their non-partisan counterparts. 
Table 12 Government performance evaluations: identifiers vs. non-
identifiers among Black Africans by percentage, 2000 
Economic evaluations Identifiers Non-partisans 
Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with economic conditions in SA? 
Dissatisfied/ very dissatisfied 60 69 
Satisfied/ very satisfied 19 14 
How do economic conditions compare to one year ago? 
Much worse/ worse 49 59 
Better/much better 19 16 
Overall direction of the country? 
Going in the right direction 49 34 
Gong in the wrong direction 42 55 
Cognitive mobilisation 
There is convincing evidence from post world war Western Europe and the 
United States to suggest that voter evaluations of political parties depend largely 
on access to and the use of political information (Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1977). 
As socio-economic development occurs, the expansion of education produces a 
more sophisticated public by increasing voters’ political skills, while the 
availability of political information broadens resources and reduces the cost of 
acquiring political information. Access to formal education and electronic news 
media, or ‘cognitive mobilisation’, has steadily reduced the effects of 
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sociological factors such as class and religion on party identification. Voting is 
influenced by what people know as well as by who they are. Voters use available 
information to reason about political parties, candidates, and issues and connect 
information to government performance.  
In South Africa it is reasonable to expect that the developmental changes 
described earlier do play a role in shaping the partisanship of different groups. 
Yet, despite the relatively high levels of media use and formal education 
compared to other African countries, there is little evidence to suggest that 
access to news has increased since 1994 (Mattes 2005: 44).  
The use of news media and the level of formal education are indications of the 
amount of political information to which voters are exposed and the cognitive 
skills required to make use of that information.  Yet, they do not tell us whether 
citizens are more or less politically aware or engaged in the political process. 
Idasa and Afrobarometer surveys asked people about their interest in politics 
and the frequency with which they engage in political discussion. Since 1994, no 
more than one-twentieth frequently engage in discussion with family or friends 
and more than one-third stated that they never do. Only one-tenth frequently 
follows public affairs (Mattes 2005: 44). Levels of political cognitive 
engagement are low among the South African electorate and a large percentage 
of voters remain relatively unengaged and uninformed about politics and policy 
issues.  
Yet, variations in the level of cognitive awareness among voters do play an 
indirect role in party identification. Depending on whether a voter is evaluating 
the governing party or opposition parties, cognitive awareness shapes voter 
evaluations differently. Voters with limited access to news media and education 
can still acquire information about the governing ANC party by assessing 
national performance from their personal situations. However, assessing 
opposition party performance is a little more difficult due to a lack of 
performance track records. Voters do not possess sufficient performance-based 
information and therefore need to rely on alternative information sources to 
inform themselves about opposition parties. Party imagery, or the racial 
credentials of political parties, then becomes important influences on voters’ 
views of how well parties represent them. However, different levels of cognitive 
skills moderate the influence of these racial or ethnic images. Voters with 
limited access to information and/or limited cognitive skills make greater use of 




The influence of party images  
When voters have little information, they rely on ‘information shortcuts’, often 
in the form of clues supplied by a candidates dress, race, and accent, which 
provide information as to the potential attitudes and performance of that party in 
government. Party images therefore act as an alternative source of voter 
information and are cues that help voters complete their assessments (Popkin 
1991: 59). They take on either positive or negative connotations for voters as 
people use them to judge, among other things, whether parties are exclusive or 
inclusive. Inclusivity shapes the credibility and trustworthiness of a party and 
reveals important information about whether it is representative of the voter’s 
interests.  
The role of race in South African elections is linked to the way voters perceive 
which group interests particular parties represent. Afrobarometer data shows that 
people generally see their own parties as inclusive of all South Africans. Voters 
are not overly preoccupied with affirming their racial identities through political 
parties at election time. Yet, significant numbers of voters are unsure about 
whether other opposition parties are inclusive or exclusive of them or simply 
perceive opposition parties to be solely exclusive. The 1994 Idasa survey and its 
companion survey in 1999 asked a series of questions about the exclusivity of 
different parties, such as: “Do you think that (party x) looks after the interests of 
all in South Africa or after the interests of one group only?” Fewer than five 
percent of Africans viewed the ANC as an exclusive party, whereas whites, 
Coloureds and Indians largely saw it as representing only one group. Data also 
shows that while non-partisan black African voters do not support the ANC, 
they often hold more negative views of opposition parties. As for the 
Democratic Party (the predecessor to the DA), while whites did not see it as 
exclusive, Africans did, particularly in 1999, and they generally identified the 
nature of the exclusion as racial.7  
Voters use the logic of exclusion rather than representation to judge where their 
interests lie: voters’ judge a party by who is excluded from it, not who is 
represented by it. The racial credentials of parties and evaluations of party 
images therefore appear to affect voting behaviour.  
 
                                                 
7 The Democratic Party (DP) changed its name to the Democratic Alliance (DA) after a 
merger with the New National Party (NNP) take took place in 2000. The DA retained its 
name when the NNP left the alliance in 2001.  
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The influence of sociological factors 
Voting is as much conditioned by who one is as by what one believes and, as 
seen above, the sociological context can act as an information source to inform 
voters about which party is likely to reflect their interests best.  
Using Opinion ‘99 data, Mattes and Piombo (2001) show that voters from 
different race groups form different evaluations of the same criteria leading 
them to conclude that race tends to shape what voters think, not the way they 
think about issues. Race therefore takes on an indirect or moderating effect on 
the voting decision by providing an important information cue about 
government performance and party images. 
This has come about as a result of radical differences in living conditions across 
racial lines, which has lead to relative homogeneity of economic and political 
interests within racial groups. Overlapping class and racial identities partly 
account for continuing racial polarisation of party politics. The resilience of 
race, and not class, in electoral politics is also aided by political rhetoric, 
transformatory legislation, redistributive policies, and patronage. While these 
are justifiable and necessary facets of a post-apartheid South Africa, they 
continue to affect voter perceptions by sending out racial cues that reinforce the 
belief that group and individual prospects correlate. The irony of the transition 
process lies in the extent to which apartheid identities are relied upon in efforts 
to bring about positive transformation. These cues act as useful directives to 
voters by helping them make a connection between their interests and electoral 
options. 
Despite signs of a growing class salience, these identities are not yet affecting 
electoral politics. The ANC has proved itself adept at building a cross-class 
support base thus disallowing class to eclipse race as the basis for political 
identities. The ANC’s ‘double class compromise’, where business, the working 
classes and the poor have benefited in different ways, has paid electoral 
dividends (Seekings 2005a: 36). 
Afrobarometer data does not show any major divergences of opinion across 
racial groups about policy areas and also shows that most South Africans are in 
agreement about the key challenges facing the country. Moreover, there are no 
substantial divergences on salient political and economic policy between 
political parties, which could account for racial explanations. Major parties do 
not necessarily offer the electorate a choice of contrasting ideological positions, 
with most manifestos in recent elections essentially calling for the strengthening 
of the formal economy through increased investment, improved delivery to the 
people in the form of jobs and a widening of the social security net. There may 
be differences between parties on how to realise various policies or on 
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distributional issues but where differences do exist, they are subtle and to be 
found in the technical details, and it remains difficult to grasp how their impacts 
would differ across different groups. 
After testing data, Seekings found race to be a more powerful factor in 
explaining voting behaviour than other sociological or attitudinal variables on 
their own. But it was no more powerful than partisan identification or a 
combination of other sociological or attitudinal variables. As Seekings (2005b: 
18) concluded, ‘the most complete explanation of voting behaviour needs to 
include some of these other variables alongside race’. 
Towards an integrated model of voter 
behaviour  
South African voters do not make up their minds anew at each election – to a 
large extent, partisanship guides electoral outcomes. Yet, survey data shows that 
multiple factors drive party identification as new information about political and 
economic developments combines with assessments of party images and 
cognitive skills.  
Race is clearly an important factor in South African elections yet data show little 
evidence for theories that characterise voting as a racial census. If voting is an 
expression of racial identity, then voters should connect the party they are 
supporting with their identity group. However, data shows that South Africans 
are not overwhelmingly preoccupied with affirming their racial identities 
through political parties at election time. The high number of independents 
across racial groups and the influence of evaluations on partisanship also 
suggest that voters do not use elections merely to register their communal ties or 
racial identities.   
If this is true, how does one explain the appearance of racially aligned voting 
outcomes? Scientists are quick to remind us that correlation does not equal 
causation. As Christopher Achen (1992) explains, ‘correlation between 
demographic factors and the vote do not explain the vote – they themselves need 
to be explained.’  So how does race help our understanding of voting behaviour? 
The intersection of individual and group interests means that a group identity, 
like race, can act as an indirect information short cut for South African voters. 
Voter calculations aim for maximising electoral payoffs, whilst reducing 
inherent costs that go with obtaining information to inform themselves about 
politics, by turning to available information sources that are sociological by 
nature. ‘Race is not important because of the passions it inspires or tradition it 
embodies but because of the information it conveys’ (Posner 2005: 104).  
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South African voters are not unlike voters found elsewhere. Green et al. (2002) 
found that partisanship in the United States is also guided by a sense of who 
belongs to various social and economic groups and voters’ relationship to them. 
Voters compare their self-image to what they perceive as the social bases of 
parties and then conduct a matching process to find an appropriate fit between 
the two.  
It seems likely that racial groups will remain important cues or information 
shortcuts for partisan identities among South African voters for as long as these 
group stereotypes persist as salient identities in politics.  
The 2006 municipal elections  
Following a year of nation-wide protests over poor service delivery, analysts 
expected the 2006 local elections to provide some indication of voter 
dissatisfaction with ANC incumbents at the local level, where municipalities 
deliver basic services. Events over the previous year had clearly indicated that 
the electorate was willing to express its discontent at the slow pace of service 
delivery in some localities. Many citizens also believe that municipalities 
perform worse than national and provincial government. The results from the 
2005 HSRC / IEC survey also indicated that the local sphere of government was 
viewed less favourably than were the provincial and national spheres of 
government (wa Kivilu et al. 2005:3). The election offered voters an opportunity 
to punish incumbents for delivery failures at local level. The potential for 
realignment were also deemed to be higher than usual. Voters were offered new 
political choices with a wider array of localised parties and grassroots 
organisations, such as the Operation Khanyisa Movement. The amount of self-
declared floating voters or independents prior to the elections was also 
significant. A Markinor survey done on 15 February 2006 recorded 30 per cent  
of voters were undecided on the eve of the election - a potentially significant 
‘swing vote’.  
Despite these uncertainties, the ANC marched to victory once again, increasing 
their percentage of the vote share in many municipalities. Opposition witnessed 
further fragmentation with the associated rise of smaller, localised parties in 
some areas. So how does one explain the increased dominance of the ANC at 
local level, and the concomitant stagnation of opposition party fortunes, despite 
the indicated discontent over service delivery? Election results show continuity 
with earlier analyses. Asymmetrical dealignment continues while changes in 
demographics and turnout continue to affect overall trends. Results also reaffirm 
that voter evaluations of government performance affect party support while 
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party images continue to affect the way in which voters align themselves to 
parties. 
Trends in turnout  
Trends show consistently higher turnout at national and provincial elections than 
municipal elections which averages 48 per cent across all three municipal 
elections.  
Table 13: Comparison of turnout as % of registered voters  
Local elections 1995 2000 2006 
 48.5 48.07 48.4 
National elections 1994 1999 2004 
 No registration 89.3 76.7 
The national elections also have a turnout rate much higher than that of the local 
elections in the provinces and at local level. For example, provincial turnout at 
the 2006 local election in the Western Cape was 51 per cent versus 73 per cent 
in the 2004 national election. Whereas the City of Cape Town metropole 
achieved 86 per cent in 1999 and 73 per cent in the 2004 national elections, the 
turnout for the 2006 metropole was only 52 per cent. Turnout figures are 
consistent with many other democratic countries where the electorate seems to 
favour national and provincial elections over municipal or local elections 
(Socio-Economic Surveys Unit of the Knowledge System Group 2005b: 3). 
Table 14 Provincial turnout at local elections as % of registered voters 
Years 1995  2000 2006 
Eastern Cape 55 56 57 
Free State 53 49 47 
Gauteng 49 43 42 
KwaZulu-Natal 46 47 51 
Limpopo 46 42 45 
Mpumalanga 53 45 46 
North West 45 45 46 
Northern Cape 65 58 54 
Western Cape 60 58 52 
Source: 2006 Municipal Elections Results. Report presented at the IEC’s National Results 
Centre, Pretoria on 3 March 2006. 
While turnout averaged 48 per cent of registered voters in 2006, when turnout is 
calculated using figures for all eligible voters (VAP), it is clear that a growing 
proportion and increasing numbers of voters chose not to vote. As Steven 
Friedman remarked, about a quarter of all eligible voters are not registered, 
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which means that, at best, only 50 per cent of three-quarters of all eligible voters 
went to the polls. Only two-fifths of the population voted (Business Day 8/3/06). 
Evaluations of Government Performance 
Turnout figures are instructive when it is considered that they may represent an 
indirect method of lodging dissatisfaction with government performance. Many 
voters punished incumbents (and challengers) by not voting at all. Abstentions 
do not necessarily signal voter apathy, since citizens also withdraw their 
temporary support from politics to show their discontent over the lack of service 
delivery.  
Local protests also suggest that voters are inclined to hold government 
accountable between elections, not just at elections. Moreover, while voters may 
feel strongly that government has failed them on specific areas of delivery, 
many generally believe that the ANC has done a good job overall. Positive 
national performance ratings almost certainly worked favourably for the ANC’s 
local government election campaign strategy, which emphasised government’s 
success at the national level, through the use of billboards promoting its 
achievements in positive economic growth, the ‘feel good factor’ in the country 
and the use of President Mbeki as the focal point. Mbeki also elevated 
developmental issues in his State of the Nation speech in a local election year 
while offering honest appraisal of failures at local level with the campaign 
slogan ‘Make Local Government Work Better’. Delivery failures were openly 
acknowledged and then sidelined. The campaign also pointed to the massive 
relative improvements in people’s lives, reinforcing the perception that an ANC 
government can best achieve the majority’s socio-economic interests.  
Party Images 
Party images still resonate in voter evaluations and present the other half of the 
story. Further fracturing of the opposition bloc shows some inter-party 
movement between opposition parties. However, there is little evidence that 
opposition voters moved their support to the ANC or visa versa. Low turnout 
coupled with a lack of realignment was partly attributable to the limited appeal 
of opposition parties which failed to encroach into the ANC support base.  
Several smaller parties managed to undermine both DA and ANC power bases 
in the Western and Northern Cape, where they look set to dominate future 
coalition agreements. Their successes suggest voters are prepared to realign 
themselves politically. In particular, the DA suffered at the hands of the 
newcomers to local elections, the Independent Democrats (ID), who gained a 
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crucial portion of the opposition vote across the Western Cape, effectively 
denying the DA its outright majority in the Cape Town Metropolitan Council 
and smaller local councils. The ID attracted increased support, partly because its 
more ‘inclusive image’ allowed for voting support from across the traditional 
political spectrum, but also because it represented a new political home for 
Coloured voters in these provinces, many of whom may have formerly voted for 
the NNP. In contrast to older parties which opted for more inclusive campaigns 
but failed to convince voters (such as the NNP during the 2004 election), the ID 
may stand a chance to appeal across old divides and build a broad multi-racial 
support base. It lacks the history that tainted older ‘apartheid generation’ parties 
such as the ‘NNP’.  
The DA’s campaign strategy, particularly in the Western Cape, starkly reflected 
its ongoing dilemma - its increasing need for a performance track record in 
governance coupled with the need to remedy its negative party image among 
black voters.  
We know that voters use party images as secondary information sources when 
no performance track record is available. In South Africa, most opposition 
parties face this dilemma. The DA embarked on the most likely strategy to win 
voter support in Cape Town, thereby earning the chance to obtain a performance 
track record, at the expense of making short-term gains among the black African 
electorate. The decisive factor for the political fate of Cape Town metropole was 
the relative turnout of the different partisan groups. In 2000 the DA mobilised its 
supporters in higher numbers than the ANC, thus giving it control of the unicity, 
only to lose it shortly thereafter to the ANC in the floor-crossing period. The DA 
knew that a 2006 victory relied on ensuring high turnout among white and 
Coloured voters, particularly former NNP voters. While African and white 
citizens constitute approximately 50 per cent of potential voters in Cape Town, 
the other half consists of the politically fragmented Coloured community. 
Especially crucial was the need to ensure that the bloc opposition vote was not 
fragmented any further by smaller opposition parties, which would have the 
effect of nullifying higher turnout for the DA.    
These demographic calculations informed DA strategy - a reactionary campaign 
message would be most successful in attracting its target partisan groups. ‘Take 
our city back’ and ‘Stop ANC racism’ both served the purpose of ‘racially 
grouping’ the scramble for resources in the city and shows a clear attempt to 
mobilise the vital Coloured portion of the vote.     
Having secured the mayoral position in the City of Cape Town Metropole by a 
slim coalition-led majority, the DA will be set on achieving an outstanding 
performance track record from which black African voters can turn to, to 
evaluate the party, before they turn to using the DA’s traditionally negative 
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party image. The irony lies in the party’s choice to utilise negative and limiting 
messages and imagery to secure power, which, may, in turn, help it to mobilise a 
wider political audience in the future.     
The highly contested multi-party environment in Cape Town also reconfirmed 
the fallacy of the uniformity of the so-called ‘Coloured vote’ and the 
inadequacies of the ‘racial census’ argument. Results again show that the 
Coloured sections of the electorate are not politically homogenous or 
predisposed to a particular party, dividing its support between the ANC, DA and 
ID. Electoral trends since 1994 in the Western Cape support the general 
interpretation that voting is also contingent on short-term factors such as 
campaign and circumstances (Seekings 2005b: 4). Yet, the electoral volatility 
witnessed in Cape Town over the past ten years may lessen as in-migration of 
Africans expands the ANC’s support base, thereby changing the proportional 
sizes of precariously balanced partisan groups.  
Conclusion 
The argument of this paper is that a silent revolution is under way among South 
Africa’s voters.  Its characteristics may be found in the increasing numbers of 
‘floating voters’ who are not overtly loyal to one particular political party, nor 
guided by long-standing partisan ties when deciding which party to support at 
elections. Where party identification was crystallised and reinforced in 1994 by 
historical factors, a dozen years later there are fewer voters predisposed towards 
any party. The fact that the extent of mobile voting or electoral availability is 
significant offers the potential to reshape future electoral outcomes. 
Levels of partisanship have generally fallen across all social groups. Black 
African voters are consistently more likely to be party identifiers than other race 
groups but, on average, only 65 per cent of black voters are close to a particular 
party. Rural voters are more likely to support a party than their urban 
counterparts; middle class voters are slowly becoming more partisan, while 
workers and the unemployed show signs of partisan decline. The silent 
revolution may have its biggest hold among the youngest voters who are 
becoming less aligned and the new middle classes who show signs of growth in 
partisanship.  
The ANC still holds mass appeal across key demographic groups. Yet several 
factors signal that the ANC’s support may become less broad based, as the party 
becomes increasingly reliant on specific segments of the public for its electoral 
support. Its vote share has decreased significantly. Second, its percentage of 
identifiers has declined with less than half the electorate declaring themselves to 
be ANC partisans. The degree of loyalty felt towards the party has also 
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diminished. Finally, while its strongest partisans are found among black 
Africans, the unemployed, rural dwellers and working class voters respectively 
this looks set to change if emerging trends stabilise, such as the increase in 
support from middle class and older voters, and the decline among workers and 
the unemployed. 
Moreover, individual voters are not dominated by long-term socialised party 
attachments but also inform their party identification using evaluations of 
government performance and make logical deductions about their information 
sources when making a choice of which party to support. 
Nonetheless, changes in electoral trends or patterns should not be mistaken for 
changes in the behaviour of individual voters. As the South African population 
undergoes further demographic and socio-economic changes, it is likely that the 
sizes and distribution of different social groups will alter and affect voting 
results. For example, changes over time to the age, race or class status 
composition of the population can produce different results in certain areas.  
Moreover, in situations where partisan groups are relatively equal in size, 
differential turnout can cause swings and shifts entirely unrelated to changes in 
individual voter behaviour. Major power shifts in Cape Town are not necessarily 
voter realignments but due rather to demographic change as migration into the 
city boosts the ANC’s share of traditional voters (Seekings 2005b). In Kwa-Zulu 
Natal, the Inkatha Freedom Party’s support base has also been eroded as 
demographic processes proceed, such as integration into the urban economy 
(Friedman 2005).    
For the moment demographics will also dictate the degree of electoral 
competition. Areas that have several relatively evenly sized demographic, 
particularly racial groups, such as Cape Town, are likely to experience higher 
levels of electoral contestation and volatility. 
Of concern is the dealignment trend displayed in the data. As party identification 
declines, the majority of voters do not politically realign themselves. Instead, 
they become non-partisan in attitude, become harder to mobilise and generally 
abstain. Electoral change has not yet had visible electoral consequences for the 
percentages of support for the governing party but instead has subtle 
implications for active political engagement and partisanship. Electoral 
stagnation may have negative effects on the quality of South Africa’s 
democracy. Dealignment should free more voters to shift their party support. 
Yet new political contenders are slow to emerge and garner a serious portion of 
the national vote. The lack of realignment also decreases the chances for 
electoral uncertainty, thereby discouraging incumbent responsiveness to voter 
interests. Where the outcome of an election is not in doubt, incumbents have less 
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incentive to be responsive and accountable to the citizenry. Declining support 
for the opposition has also served to strengthen relative support for ANC.  
 
In the face of continued one-party dominance, the greatest challenge for 
democracy in the next decade will be maintaining high levels of incumbent 
responsiveness towards citizens.    
Social groups remain important cues or information shortcuts for South African 
voters and while electoral politics continues to pivot around fixed identities, 
such as race, weakening party bonds will simply continue to provide the 
governing party with larger majorities from increasingly smaller electorates. In 
the medium-term, electoral outcomes will continue to mirror the racial cleavages 
of the past.  
The findings here also hold implications for the conduct of party politics.  
The problems of dealignment do not lie with voters as such. Instead, the limited 
appeal of many opposition parties is a primary factor. To seriously contest future 
elections, these parties need to be more attentive and responsive to subtle shifts 
in political identities. Parties wanting to build multi-ethnic and racial coalitions 
will need to address the way in which they are perceived in terms of racial 
exclusivity. Those that struggle to present genuinely inclusive racial and ethnic 
imagery will not attract widespread support. Finally, any chance of increased 
political competition still seems to pivot around intra-ANC contestation. 
Demographic changes to the party’s core support base may force new shifts in 
policy positions, which could deepen the ideological rift with the tripartite 
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This paper is based on ongoing doctoral research which consists of an analysis 
of change over time in the aggregate patterns of party support among social 
groups and to the motivations of voter behaviour by comparing different 
electorates over 12 years using data from a series of cross-sectional surveys. To 
test for changes the study operationalised sets of independent variables or 
competing theoretical models of voting behaviour. Findings are based on a range 
of statistical analyses such as cross-tabulations of structural and demographic 
variables and multivariate data analyses (logistic regression).   
 
Most of the national public opinion surveys were fielded around the time of 
national, provincial and local elections in South Africa and were designed 
precisely for electoral research purposes. Moreover, the designs reflect well-
established traditions of electoral research originating at the University of 
Michigan, which have been used extensively in similar survey-based research 
projects worldwide. Consequently, the surveys used here employ indicators 
which have been tested rigorously in other country studies. In particular, the 
Afrobarometer series is based on the international Barometer surveys 
(Eurobarometer, Latino-barometer, and so on). In line with these regional survey 
instruments, Afrobarometer’s design takes into consideration South Africa’s 
peculiarities and contextual constraints, whilst still employing international best 
practise and experience in its choice of variables and overall design. 
 
Although the data is sourced over time from cross-sectional surveys each 
consisting of individual samples, the sampling frame, method of sampling and 
sample size are all sufficiently similar to make comparisons over time valid. 
Each sample is representative of the wider South African population, using 
probability sampling methods such as stratified and multistage cluster sampling. 
Sample quality was also improved by applying statistical weighting adjustments 
during the analysis stage to minimise sample biases. Large sample sizes ensure 
that the surveys have a sampling error between 3 and 2 per cent allowing for 95 
per cent confidence levels.  
 
Idasa post-election study (1994)  
 
This survey focused on the 1994 general election and specifically on voting 
intention, attitudes towards democracy, economic evaluations and various other 
political issues. Personal interviews were conducted with    2 517 eligible voters. 
The type of instrument used was a semi-structured survey personal interview 
recorded on questionnaires. The final results were weighted to reflect an 




Idasa local government election study (1995)  
 
The Idasa local election study provides the first systematic evidence about 
individual attitudes toward the legitimacy of the new local government system. 
This study consisted of a sample that is nationally representative, drawn using a 
multi-stage, clustered random probability sample disproportionately stratified by 
province, population group and community size (metro, city, large town, small 
town, village and rural). Interviews were conducted with 2 674 people. The type 
of instrument used was a semi-structured survey personal interview recorded on 
questionnaires. The final results were weighted to reflect an electorate estimated 
at 24.3 million voters. 
 
Political culture study (1997)  
 
This study focused on people’s attitudes toward identity, diversity, citizenship, 
democracy, and democratic institutions. The study consisted of a sample, which 
was nationally representative, drawn using a multi-stage, clustered random 
probability sample disproportionately stratified by province, population group 
and community size. Structured personal interviews were conducted with 3 500 
respondents and final results were weighted to reflect an electorate estimated at 
over 24 million voters. 
 
Opinion ’99 (1999)  
 
Opinion '99 was a series of opinion polls conducted prior to the 1999 election by 
Idasa, Markinor and the SABC, and the Electoral Institute of South Africa. They 
provide information about South Africans’ views of the political, social and 
economic developments in the country since 1994. The polls covered key issues 
related to the conduct of free and fair elections, voter participation, and other 
economic, political and partisan trends. In each round between 2200 and 3493 
interviews were conducted. The samples for Opinion ’99 were drawn using a 
multi-stage, area stratified probability sampling methodology, and stratified by 
province, population group and community size and all three samples were 
representative of the universe from which they were selected. The type of 
instrument used was a semi-structured survey personal interview recorded on 
questionnaires. 
 
Afrobarometer Rounds 1; 2; 2.5 (2000, 2002, 2004) 
 
The Afrobarometer survey series of South Africa is designed to assess attitudes 
about democracy, markets, and civil society in South Africa and to track the 
evolution of such attitudes over time. The samples are drawn using multi-stage, 
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stratified, area cluster probability sample. Each survey carries out at least 2 200 
personal interviews. 
 
Comparative National Elections Project [CNEP] (2004) 
 
The CNEP is a multi-national project that studies political communication and 
social structure within the context of election campaigns. The CNEP survey was 
carried out nationally across South Africa in 2004 and covers aspects of the third 
democratic election that took place during that year. The sample was drawn 
using multi-stage, stratified, area cluster probability sample. During the survey 
at least 1 200 personal interviews were carried out.  
 
 
